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TRUSTS-TRUSTEES-INVESTMENT DUTIES OF TRUSTEES AND 
THE PROBLEM OF UNDULY-CONSERVATIVE TRUST INVESTMENTS-
A few years ago a New Jersey court, in the case of Commercial 
Trust Co. v. Barnard,1 was asked, in effect, to surcharge a trustee 
for being overly conservative in investing the res of a discretionary 
trust. The income beneficiaries and remaindermen alleged that 
the trustee had breached its duty by failing to exercise its discre-
tionary power to convert investments in low-yield government 
1 27 N.J. 332, 142 A.2d 865 (1958). 
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securities into more diversified higher-yield investments, despite a 
decline in yield from 14.27 percent in 1927 to 1.51 percent in 
1955. Although recovery was denied, the court did not foreclose 
the possibility that a trustee may be surcharged, on the theory of 
breach of duty, for pursuing an unduly-conservative investment 
policy. In exonerating the trustee, the court emphasized the fact 
that the investment policy followed was actually quite reasonable, 
since the high tax bracket of the beneficiaries made it advisable 
that investments in their behalf be in tax-exempt securities. 
In the more recent case of In re Mayo,2 a Minnesota court was 
asked by a trust beneficiary to allow the trustee to deviate from 
the express terms of a trust, created in 1917, which prohibited in-
vestment in corporate stock. The court granted the trustees the 
right to invest a reasonable amount of the fund in common stock 
if the trustees felt such investments were advisable. In reaching 
its decision, the court took note of economic conditions, including 
a fifty percent decline in the purchasing power of the trust corpus 
since the settlor's death in 1~39. The court's primary justification 
for its action was the belief that failure to allow deviation would 
frustrate the dominant intent of the settlor to preserve the trust 
principal. 
Though the two cases described above dealt with admittedly 
different areas of trust law, both were concerned with a common 
problem. In both cases it was alleged that the investment policies 
followed by the trustee, although valid at the time of the estab-
lishment of the trust, were no longer fully exploiting the invest-
ment potential of the trust, resulting in detriment to the bene-
ficiaries. As such1 both cases indicate that trust law has not yet 
formulated a means of protecting beneficiaries against unduly-
conservative trust investments, which may be as costly to them as 
an overly-speculative investment policy. 
This comment will first examine the trustee's investment du-
ties, particularly those relating to investments in securities, and 
then consider the factors which have brought to the fore the prob-
lem of the unduly-conservative trust investment. On the basis of 
this examination, it may be determined whether the present law 
in this area provides the beneficiary with adequate safeguards 
against the unduly-conservative investment. Finally, assuming 
such safeguards have not been provided, some suggested remedies 
2 259 Minn. 91, 105 N.W.2d 900 (1960). Cf. Bliss v. Bliss, 126 N.J. Eq. 308, 8 A.2d 705 
(Ch. 1939), afj'd, 127 N.J. Eq. 20, 11 A.2d 13 (Ct. Err. & App. 1940). 
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for this situation will be considered, including the possible impo-
sition of a duty upon trustees to invest at least part of the trust 
funds in common stock. 
I. TRUSTEES' INVESTMENT DUTIES 
A. In General 
The trustee must invest the trust res in accordance with the 
expressed intent of the settlor or testator;8 deviation will be sanc-
tioned only in certain emergency situations.4 However, due to 
the greatly increased use of the discretionary trust,5 trustees fre-
quently find few investment limitations imposed by the trust in-
strument itself. In such a situation, the trustee is required to act 
as would a reasonably or ordinarily prudent man in making his 
investment choices, and his failure to act as such will render him 
liable to the trust's beneficiaries.6 Both decisional and statutory 
law have provided guidelines within which trustees must stay in 
order to satisfy this rather vague standard of reasonableness and 
thereby avoid the possibility of surcharge. 
In applying the reasonable man standard, courts have main-
tained that a trustee has not fulfilled his obligations by merely 
acting as would a reasonable man investing his own money; rather, 
the trustee must act as a reasonable man investing the money of 
another.7 The clear implication of this distinction is the belief 
that a prudent man is likely to incur fewer risks with assets en-
trusted to his care than he would with his own personal funds.8 
It is well settled that in judging the reasonableness of an invest-
ment the circumstances at the time of investment are to be con-
trolling, and hindsight may not be employed to second-guess the 
trustee and burden him with liability.9 Despite this doctrine, it 
is hardly likely that hindsight is not a prominent consideration in 
s See Vest v. Bialson, 365 Mo. ll03, 293 S.W.2d 369 (1956); Davis v. Davis Trust Co., 
106 W. Va. 228, 145 S.E. 588 (1928). 
4 See, e.g., In re Mayo, 259 Minn, 91, 105 N.W.2d 900 (1960); Bliss v. Bliss, 126 N.J. 
Eq. 308, 8 A.2d 705 (Ch. 1939), aff'd, 127 N.J. Eq. 20, II A.2d 13 (Ct. Err. &: App. 1940). 
I> See Stevenson, Why the Prudent Man?, 7 VAND. L. REv. 74 (1953). 
o See Mattocks v. Moulton, 84 Me. 545, 24 Atl. 1004 (1892); Springfield Safe Deposit 
&: Trust Co. v. First Unitarian Soc'y, 293 Mass. 480, 200 N.E. 541 (1936); Rand v. McKit-
trick, 346 Mo. 466, 142 S.W.2d 29 (1940). 
7 See In re Estate of Cook, 20 Del. Ch. 123, 171 Atl. 730 (Ch. 1934); In re Buhl's 
Estate, 2II Mich. 124, 178 N.W. 651 (1920). But cf. Fox v. Harris, 141 Md. 495, II9 Atl. 
256 (1922); Gray v. Lynch, 33 Md. (8 Gill.) 403 (1849). 
s See Mattocks v. Moulton, 84 Me. 545, 24 Atl. 1004 (1892); In re Buhl's Estate, supra 
note 7; Miller v. Pender, 93 N.H. 1, 34 A.2d 663 (1943). 
o Sec Bowker v. Pierce, 130 Mass. 262 (1881); In re Beebe's Estate, 52 N.Y.S.2d 736 
(Surr. Ct. 1943). 
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the examination of unprofitable investments which were made 
years before the time of the trial. 
B. Statutory Influences 
Legislation has also played a significant part in delineating the 
permissible scope of trust investments.10 Such statutes are in effect 
a codification of the reasonable man rule; that is, they represent 
legislative attempts to define, or at least provide some guidelines 
for, the type of investments which a trustee may permissibly 
make. The statutes may be broadly broken down into two cate-
gories. 
In the first of these fall what are commonly called "legal list" 
statutes.11 These statutes attempt to enumerate specifically those 
types of investments in which a reasonable trustee may safely in-
vest trust funds.12 Such investments do not, however, free the 
trustee from his duty to act as a reasonable man in determining 
which of the items on the legal list he should select.18 While some 
"legal list" jurisdictions have treated investments outside the list 
as a per se breach of duty,14 others have imposed liability only if 
the trustee has not acted as a prudent man in making such invest-
ments.15 Of course, the settlor may free the trustee of the restraints 
of the statutory legal list by a clear expression of his intent to do 
so.16 In such a situation, the trustee's duty is, once again, only to 
act as a prudent man, according to the common-law standard. 
The most striking deficiency of the legal lists is their failure 
to include common stock as a suitable investment, such absence 
seemingly being attributable to the old English common-law doc-
10 See Stevenson, supra note 5, at 91-92, for a state-by-state breakdown of such statutes. 
11 Legal list statutes are today in force in less than a dozen states. See Stevenson, 
supra note 5, at 92. 
12 E.g., IowA ConE § 682.23 (Supp. 1962), which provides that all money received by 
a fiduciary to be invested be placed in the following types of securities: federal bonds; 
federal bank bonds; state bonds; municipal bonds; real estate mortgage bonds; corporate 
mortgages; railroad bonds; bonds guaranteed by railroads; bonds and debentures guaran• 
teed by the federal government; stock in federal government instrumentalities; life, en• 
dowment endorsement or annuity contracts of legal reserve life insurance companies au-
thorized to do business in Iowa. See generally Note, Inadequacy of the Iowa Legal List 
of Trust Investments, 36 IowA L. REv. 341 (1951). 
18 See In re McCafferty's Will, 147 Misc. 179, 264 N.Y. Supp. 38 (Surr. Ct. 1933). 
14 See In re McCafferty's Will, supra note 13; Estate of Herriman, 142 Misc. 164 (Surr. 
Ct. 1931). 
15 See First Nat'! Bank v. Hawley, 207 Ark. 587, 182 S.W.2d 194 (1944); In re 
Estate of Cook, 20 Del. Ch. 123, 171 Atl. 730 (Ch. 1934); Falls v. Carruthers, 20 Tenn. 
App. 681, 103 S.W.2d 605 (1937). 
16 See Fox v. Harris, 141 Md. 495, 119 Atl. 256 (1922); In re McCafferty's Will, 
147 Misc. 179, 264 N.Y. Supp. 38 (Surr. Ct. 1933); Estate of Herriman, 142 Misc. 164 
(Surr. Ct. 1931). Cf. In re Carnell's Will, 260 App. Div. 287, 21 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1940). 
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trine that such investments were per se imprudent.17 This view 
was early accepted by the New York courts and later codified 
with the enactment in New York of a statutory legal list, which 
served as a model for numerous other subsequent enactments of 
lists.18 However, since the mid-1930's there has been a steady move-
ment away from legislative reliance on legal lists,19 primarily be-
cause of their relative inflexibility, whereby a trustee pursuant to 
such statutes is effectively prohibited from adjusting to fluctuations 
in economic conditions and to other changing circumstances.20 
Paralleling the demise of legal list statutes has been the in-
creased legislative recourse to the second general type of statutes 
defining permissible trust investments, commonly referred to as 
"prudent man" statutes.21 Such statutes, now in force in over 
thirty states, represent codifications of the so-called Massachusetts 
rule, first announced in 1830 in the landmark case of Harvard 
College v. Amory,22 and subsequently followed judicially by a 
handful of states in the nineteenth century.23 The Massachusetts 
court in the Harvard College case refused to accept the theory 
that stocks in manufacturing firms were inherently unsafe, and, 
in so doing, departed from the English common-law requirement 
that trust investments be in debt rather than in ownership in-
terests.24 As to the trustee's investment duties, the court said: 
"All that can be required of a trustee to invest, is, that he 
shall conduct himself faithfully and exercise a sound discre-
tion. He is to observe how men of prudence, discretion and 
intelligence manage their own affairs, not in regard to specu-
lation, but in regard to the permanent disposition of their 
17 See Gray v. Lynch, 33 Md. (8 Gill.) 403 (1849); In re Camell's Will, supra note 16. 
1s See King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869). 
10 Between 1940 and 1953 approximately twenty-three states adopted "prudent man" 
statutes in preference to the use of legal lists. See Stevenson, supra note 5, at 91-92. 
20 See generally Note, supra note 12. 
21 California's statute is representative of this category. CAL. CIV. ConE § 2261 
provides: "In investing ••. a trustee shall exercise the judgment and care, under the 
circumstances then prevailing, which men of prudence, discretion and intelligence 
exercise in the management of their own affairs . . . considering the probable income, 
as well as the probable safety of their capital .•.• [A] trustee is authorized to acquire 
every kind of property, real, personal or mixed, and every kind of investment, 
specifically including, but not by way of limitation, corporate obligations of every kind, 
and stocks, preferred or common • • • ." 
22 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446 (1830). 
23 See, e.g., McCoy v. Horwitz, 62 Md. 183 (1884); Peckham v. Newton, 15 R.I. 321, 4 
Atl. 758 (1886). 
24 See cases cited in note 17 supra. 
25 Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 446, 461 (1830). It is interesting to 
note that the New York court in King v. Talbot, 40 N.Y. 76 (1869), used very similar 
language. 
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funds, considering the probable income, as well as the prob-
able safety of the capital to be invested."25 
The advantages of this broad doctrine, over attempts to define 
prudent investments more specifically by the use of such devices 
as legal lists, were concisely outlined in the subsequent Massachu-
setts case of Kimball v. Whitney,26 where the court stated: 
"That is a comprehensive principle. It is wide in scope. It 
is not limited to a particular time or a special neighborhood. 
It is general and inclusive, so that while remaining itself fixed, 
it may continue to be a safe guide under new financial insti-
tutions and business customs, changed commercial methods 
and practices, altered monetary usages and investment com-
binations. It avoids the inflexibility of definite classification 
of securities, it disregards the optimism of the promoter, and 
eschews the exuberance of the speculator. It holds fast to 
common sense and depends on practical experience. It is 
susceptible of being adapted to whatever conditions may arise 
in the evolution of society and the progress of civilization."27 
Although the court in Kimball may have been guilty of some 
overstatement, trustees and writers have generally agreed that the 
flexibility of the Massachusetts rule makes it considerably more 
useful than the legal lists.28 
C. Specific Investment Duties 
I. Diversification 
In addition to the broad duty to act as a reasonable man, the 
courts have formulated specific investment duties which are bind-
ing on the trustee. Among these is the duty to diversify trust in-
vestments, which is generally recognized in those states following 
the Massachusetts rule.29 Courts following this rule have indi-
cated there must be diversification among various classes of in-
vestments as well as within any one class.80 This duty is evidently 
imposed in the hope that it will minimize the possibility of large 
26 233 Mass. 321, 123 N.E. 665 (1919). 
21 Id. at 331, 123 N.E. at 666. 
28 See Chapman, A Changing Economy Brings New Problems of Trust Investment, 
Trust Bull., Sept. 1949, p. 11; Comment, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 380 (1951); Note, 36 lowA. 
L. REv. 341 (1951); Note, 1 RUTGERS L. REv. 130 (1947). 
29 See Warren v. Pazolt, 203 Mass. 328, 89 N.E. 381 (1909); In re Davis, 183 Mass. 
499, 67 N.E. 604 (1903); In re Dickinson, 152 Mass. 184, 25 N.E. 99 (1890); The 
Pennsylvania Co. v. Gillmore, 142 N.J. Eq. 27, 59 A.2d 24 (Ch. 1948). 
80 See In re Dickinson, supra note 29; The Pennsylvania Co. v. Gillmore, supra noto 
29. 
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losses through the failure of only one of the investments in an 
entire portfolio. Although the courts have never adopted a specific 
maximum percentage, the cases as a whole indicate that courts ac-
knowledging and enforcing the duty of diversification will treat 
the investment of greater than twenty to twenty-five percent of the 
trust assets in one form as prima fade evidence of breach of duty31 
which may, however, be rebutted by evidence that the failure to 
diversify further was reasonable under the circumstances.32 
In North Adams Nat'l Bank v. Curtiss,33 the court refused to 
surcharge the trustee for retaining stock in A. T. & T., General 
Electric and First National Bank of Boston, despite the fact these 
stocks constituted a very large percentage of the trust estate. In 
reaching its decision, the court noted the fine reputation of the 
stocks involved and the fact they had originally been placed in 
the trust at its creation by the settlor. The court further pointed 
to the unfavorable tax consequences which would have occurred 
had the trustee sold the stock. The force of this decision may be 
lessened by the presence of an exculpatory clause in the trust in-
strument, though the court did not treat this fact alone as con-
trolling. 
At least two courts adhering to legal list statutes have refused 
to impose a duty of diversification upon trustees where the in-
vestments entered into were authorized according to the statutory 
list.34 The approach of these courts seems to be that trustees 
should not be restrained from taking full advantage of investments 
which the legal list and independent investigation indicate are 
sound. They repeatedly quote Andrew Carnegie's statement, "Put 
all your eggs in one basket and watch the basket." 
2. Loyalty 
While the courts may differ as to diversification, it is uniformly 
accepted that a trustee has a duty of loyalty to the trust benefici-
aries which is breached by engaging in any self-dealing with the 
property held in trust; 35 that is, the trustee may not bring his own 
31 See In re Davis, 183 Mass. 499, 67 N.E. 604 (1903), and cases cited in note 30 
supra. 
32 Cf. Security Trust Co. v. Appleton, 303 Ky. 328, 197 S.W.2d 70 (1946); North 
Adams Nat'l Bank v. Curtiss, 278 Mass. 471, 180 N.E. 217 (1932). 
33 278 Mass. 471, 180 N.E. 217 (1932). 
34 See In re Beebe's Estate, 52 N.Y.S.2d 736 (Surr. Ct. 1943); In re Adriance's 
Estate, 145 Misc. 345, 260 N.Y. Supp. 173 (Surr. Ct. 1932); Saeger Estates, 340 Pa. 73, 
16 A.2d 19 (1940). But see The Pennsylvania Co. v. Gillmore, 142 N.J. Eq. 27, 59 A.2d 
24 (1948). 
35 See Matter of Durston, 297 N.Y. 64, 74 N.E.2d 310 (1947); City Bank Farmers 
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interest into conflict with the trust's interest. Thus, a trustee may 
not buy securities in his own name and sell them to the trust at 
a profit, 36 nor use trust funds in any way to make a personal 
profit.37 In such cases, the trustee may be surcharged for the profits 
he received from the use of trust funds or for any losses incurred 
by the trust estate due to his breach. 
However, by virtue of his authority to dictate the terms of the 
trust, the settlor may specifically vest a trustee with the right to 
maintain a conflict of interest in relation to the trust.38 City Bank 
Farmers Trust Co. v. Cannon39 recognized this proposition in ex-
onerating a corporate trustee who purchased and maintained, for 
an inter vivos trust, stock in a bank closely affiliated with the trust 
company. The evidence disclosed that the settlor, who had re-
tained a life interest in the trust with the power to revoke or 
change the remainderman at any time, had insisted that the bank 
stock be retained despite the conflict of interest involved. The 
court held these factors estopped both the settlor and remainder-
man from charging the trustee with a breach of duty. However, 
Matter of Durston40 indicates that such a result will be reached 
only where the permission to maintain the conflict of interest is 
explicitly and unambiguously conferred. A divided court in that 
case held that an exceedingly broad discretionary clause41 did not 
give the corporate trustee the right to retain and purchase its own 
stock for the estate. The one dissenting judge felt the broad dis-
cretionary language of the will, combined with the knowledge of 
the testator that he was appointing as trustee one with divided 
loyalty, evidenced an intent to sanction this arrangement.42 Judg-
ing from the general tenor of the cases, a trustee should be ex-
tremely wary of relying on the settlor's consent as a basis for plac-
ing himself in a position of divided loyalty. 
3. Independent Judgment 
The trustee must also be wary to some degree of the extent 
to which he can rely upon the advice of others, for it is generally 
Trust Co. v. Cannon, 291 N.Y. 125, 51 N.E.2d 674 (1943); In re Rees' Estate, 53 Ohio L. 
Abs. 385, 85 N.E.2d 563 (Cuyahoga Co. Ct. App. 1949). 
36 See In re Rees' Estate, supra note 35. 
37 See Bowen v. Richardson, 133 Mass. 293 (1882). 
38 See Matter of Durston, 297 N.Y. 64, 74 N.E.2d 310 (1947); In re Flagg's Estate, 
365 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411 (1950). 
39 291 N.Y. 125, 51 N.E.2d 674 (1943). 
40 297 N.Y. 64, 74 N.E.2d 310 (1947). 
41 See 297 N.Y. at 69, 74 N.E.2d at 312. 
42 Cf. In re Flagg's Estate, 365 Pa. 82, 73 A.2d 411 (1950). 
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agreed that the trustee has a duty to exercise independent discre-
tion and judgment in making investment decisions, on the theory 
that the testator appointed him for this express purpose.43 This 
duty would not prohibit the trustee from seeking the advice of 
others nor from ascertaining any preferences which the bene-
ficiaries might have, as long as the final decision was his own. In 
re Garland's Will,44 in which the corporate co-trustee was sur-
charged for retaining bonds which investigation had shown were 
no longer desirable, clearly illustrates the scope of this duty. The 
court found that the trustee had breached its duty by retaining 
the bonds at the insistence of the settlor's widow, who served as 
co-trustee, and held that the corporate trustee was under a duty 
to insist upon a sale and, if necessary to overcome the co-trustee's 
opposition, to petition the appropriate court for authority to sell. 
II. FACTORS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CONCERN 
WITH UNDULY-CONSERVATIVE TRUST INVESTMENTS 
A. I n-fiation 
The greatest factor in bringing the problem of conservative 
investment to the fore is that of an inflationary economy;45 for it 
is a source of potential harm to income beneficiary and remainder-
man alike. As to the latter, it decreases the purchasing power of 
the trust principal and, if power exists to invade corpus, may also 
result in the decrease of its dollar value should the trustee find it 
necessary to divert part of the principal to the life beneficiary to 
meet the rising cost of living. The income beneficiary suffers from 
the decline in purchasing power of the income received, and may 
receive even less income, dollar-wise, if the principal shrinks 
through repeated invasion. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
income beneficiaries have striven with increased vigor to augment 
returns from trust investments46 and that remaindermen have like-
wise sought ways to increase the value of the principal.47 
48 See In re Talbot's Estate, 141 Cal. App. 2d 309, 296 P.2d 848 (1956); In re 
Garland's Will, 159 Misc. 333, 287 N.Y. Supp. 918 (Surr. Ct. 1936). The reluctance of 
the English courts to allow investments in corporate securities may have been partially 
due to the trustee's lack of control in corporate management. 
44 159 Misc. 333, 287 N.Y. Supp. 918 (Surr. Ct. 1936). 
45 The court in In re Mayo, 259 Minn. 91, 105 N.W.2d 900 (1960), was undoubtedly 
greatly influenced in its decision to allow deviation from the terms of the trust by the 
fact that inflation between 1939 and 1960 had decreased the purchasing power of the trust 
corpus by 50%. See text at note 2 supra. 
46 Cf. Commercial Trust Co. v. Barnard, 27 N.J. 332, 142 A.2d 865 (1958). 
47 Cf. In re Mayo, 259 Minn. 91, 105 N.W .2d 900 (1960); Commercial Trust Co. v. 
Barnard, supra note 46. 
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Although the problems concomitant with inflation have gained 
widespread recognition among writers,48 sharp differences of opin-
ion exist as to whether this factor should affect traditional invest-
ment behavior and, if so, in what manner and to what extent. 
Differences of opinion may focus upon any one of several dis-
putable points, the most fundamental of which relates to the ques, 
tion of whether inflation is merely a short-term phenomenon 
which does not merit a substantial revision in trust investment 
doctrine. Although at least one writer has questioned whether 
inflation in our economy will continue indefinitely,49 most ·writers 
at least feel that inflation is too important a factor to be ignored 
in the hope it will eventually disappear of its own accord. 
In determining the effect of inflation on trust investment doc-
trine, writers have been forced to come to grips with the related 
problem, which has long plagued the courts, of whether the trus-
tee's primary concern should be the preservation of principal or 
the securing of income. It is beyond dispute that the trustee has 
a duty in formulating investment policy of a twofold nature: first, 
a duty to the remainderman to guard against loss of principal, 
and, also, a duty to the income beneficiary to secure income from 
investments. 50 The courts have rather consistently indicated, how-
ever, that the trustee's primary. duty is the preservation of the trust 
principal, even if it is necessary to sacrifice income to accomplish 
this end.51 Writers have maintained that some courts have un-
justly favored the remainderman in their application of this doc-
trine. 52 In any event, it seems clear that in many situations a court 
would do serious injustice to the intent of the settlor or testator 
by subordinating his wishes with respect to income to the preser-
vation of trust principal; that is, the life beneficiary (i.e., widow 
or incompetent child) is very commonly the person for whom the 
48 See Buek, "Qualified" Trustee Performance Calls for Full Investment Freedom, 99 
TRusrs & EsTATES 194 (1960); Fingar, Changing Concepts of Trust Investments, 96 TRusrs 
& ESTATES 864 (1957); Shattuck, The Trustee's Duty To Invest, 86 TRUSTS & EsTATES 119 
(1948); Tenney, The Trustee, the Stock Market and the Measure of Damages, 96 TRusrs 
& EsTATES 824 (1957); Torrance, By Growth Obsessed: Balance and Perspective Today's 
Need in Trust Investment Policy, 97 TRUSTS & ESTATES 226 (1958); Comment, 39 CALIF. 
L. REv. 380 (1951). 
49 See Torrance, supra note 48. But see Fingar, supra note 48, at 866. 
50 In re Buhl's Estate, 211 Mich. 124, 178 N.W. 651 (1920); The Pennsylvania Co. v. 
Gillmore, 137 N.J. Eq. 51, 43 A.2d 667 (Ch. 1945). 
51 See In re Buhl's Estate, supra note 50; Brown's Estate, 287 Pa. 499, 135 Atl. 112 
(1926); Davis v. Davis Trust Co., 106 W. Va. 228, 145 S.E. 588 (1928). Cf. Miller v. Pender, 
93 N.H. 1, 34 A.2d 663 (1943). But cf. The Pennsylvania Co. v. Gillmore, supra note 50. 
52 See Fingar, supra note 48, at 864; Shattuck, supra note 48, at 119; Comment, S9 
CALIF. L. REv. 380-81 (1951). 
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settlor was most interested in providing.53 The prospect of infla-
tion has added a new twist to this old argument, for now short-
sighted concern merely for the preservation of principal may se-
riously injure the interests of the remainderman himself through 
loss of purchasing power. Despite this fact, some writers have 
argued that the trustee's duty to preserve the trust principal refers 
only to the preservation of the dollar value of the trust rather than 
to maintain its actual purchasing power.54 This theory finds sup-
port in the analogy that, as the trustee should not risk principal 
to gain income, he surely should not risk principal to accumulate 
more principal. In answer to the foregoing view, it may be argued 
that, even conceding the debatable proposition that trustees are 
primarily conservers of wealth, since dollar value in today's in-
flationary market is of little significance, 55 the only way to conserve 
wealth realistically is through preservation of the purchasing 
power, and not merely the dollar value, at the trust corpus. 
Even if one views inflation as a perpetual phenomenon and the 
trustee, at least to the extent of his duties to preserve purchasing 
power, as more than a conserver of wealth, there still remains the 
question of whether there is a feasible way to compensate for the 
effects of inflation. The pm;chase of common stock, in the hopes 
that the value of the stock and the income derived from it will 
grow at least proportionately to rate of inflation, has been sug-
gested as the only practical way to accomplish this end.56 Yet, 
this course of action may be partially or fully foreclosed to trus-
tees in states with some form of statutory legal list.57 And, even 
as to those states applying a "prudent man" standard, some writ-
ers have averred that, although common stock may be reasonably 
purchased to provide income, such purchases become unreasonably 
speculative ventures when made for the purpose of increasing 
principal.58 However, other writers have expressed the view that 
the trustee should take inflation into account, and thus it is proper, 
within the framework of the reasonable man rule, for him to se-
53 Cf. Stevenson, supra note 5, at 78. 
54 See Headly, Trustees or "Gentlemen Adventurers"!, 88 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 91 (1949); 
Torrance, supra note 48. 
515 Cf. Shattuck, supra note 48. 
1'.iO See Bardt, Selection of Securities, 91 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 742 (1952); Fingar, supra 
note 48, at 866; Jennett, Changing Concepts of Trust Investments, 94 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 
843 (1955). 
57 See text at note 18 supra. 
1i8 See Headly, supra note 54. Cf. Murray, Common Stocks in Trust, 89 TRUSTS &: 
EsTATES 829 (1950). But see Axe, Record of Equity Investment for Trust and Pension 
Funds, 89 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 508 (1950), in which the following table was used to show 
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lect common stocks which are not unduly speculative, but which 
will serve as a hedge against inflation as well as provide a sound 
income;59 that is, invest in stocks whose past history indicates to 
the prudent trustee a high probability of increased valuation and 
income in the face of continued inflation. 
Summarizing, writers in general have recognized the effects of 
inflation on trust investments but differ in their approach to this 
problem in at least three significant respects: whether inflation 
is a short- or long-term phenomenon; whether, even if the trustee 
is regarded as primarily a conserver of wealth, he fulfills his obli-
gations by maintaining the dollar value of the fund in trust, or 
whether should he instead attempt to maintain its purchasing 
power; whether the purchase of common stock as a hedge against 
inflation is inherently speculative or, rather, an effective way 
to solve a crucial problem. 
B. Declining Rate of Return From Bond Investments 
A second factor causing increasing concern with conservative 
investments is the declining rate of return from bond investments 
coupled with increased returns from attractive common stocks. 
The securities investment situation has changed greatly since the 
1920's, when few high quality stocks were available and bonds, 
on the other hand, were returning in excess of five percent. 00 
Although this factor most directly concerns the income benefi-
ciary, it may, of course, affect the interest of the remainderman if 
the right to invade principal exists. Thus, the question again 
that long-term skillful investments in common stocks, despite possible short-term fluctua-
tions, result in greater income and better protection against inflation than either fixed 
income securities or retirement annuities provided by life insurance companies: 
Basis of 30 years 
I. High-grade fixed-income 
securities (present rate of 
2½% per annum) 
2. Retirement annuity plan 
of type provided by leading 
life insurance companies 
3. Diversified high-grade 
common stock (1908-38) 
4. Diversified high-grade 
common stock (1918-48) 
Amount Value of Ratio of Value 
of Cash Fund at End of Fund to 
Invested of 30 Years Cash Invested 
$3,000,000 
3,000,000 
2,999,675 
3,000,825 
4,500,000 
4,221,000 
10,331,075 
10,168,875 
1.50 
1.41 
3.44 
3.39 
59 See Buek, supra note 48, at 194-95; Fingar, supra note 48, at 866; Comment, 39 
CALIF. L. R.Ev. 380, 388-93 (1951). Cf. Tenney, supra note 48. 
60 See Jennett, supra note 56, at 844. Compare Jennings, Caution in Equity Selection, 
99 TRUSTS &: ESTATES 556 (1960). 
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arises whether stocks should be substituted for traditionally safer, 
but now lower yielding, bonds. 
C. The Growth of the Professional Trustee 
One final factor is significant in explaining the recent concern 
with unduly-conservative trust investments. This is the growth in 
importance, to the point of predominance, of the professional 
trustee in the field of trust administration and investment.61 It is 
noteworthy that the principal doctrines relating to the investment 
of trust funds were developed most significantly at a time when 
most trustees were amateurs.62 Conservative investment by a trus-
tee who is relatively unfamiliar with wise investment practices and 
policies is not only justifiable, but is also necessary to give some 
degree of protection to the income beneficiary and the remainder-
man. On the other hand, the professional trustee is almost in-
variably in a far better position to increase the return for the 
income beneficiary and accumulate added principal for the re-
mainderman safely through the discriminating and informed pur-
chase of various securities. His advantage lies both in his greater 
experience in extensively investing large amounts of funds and 
his access to economic and financial reports, data and statistics 
analyzing all relevant investment information. Thus, the emer-
gence of the professional trustee has furnished a strong arguing 
point for those alleging that trust law currently imposes an unwar-
ranted degree of conservatism upon trust investment practices. 
III. SAFEGUARDS AGAINST UNDULY-CONSERVATIVE 
TRUST INVESTMENTS 
Admitting that the factors discussed above impart added sig-
nificance to the problem of unduly-conservative trust investments, 
the question still remains whether trust beneficiaries are in some 
way legally safeguarded against such investments. Initially, there 
are apparently no court decisions surcharging a trustee on the 
ground that he pursued an unduly-conservative investment policy. 
Indeed, several of the doctrines of trust law previously examined 
would seem to encourage trustees to take a highly conservative 
approach to investment practice. An excellent example is the 
emphasis placed on the preservation of principal rather than the 
61 See Tenney, supra note 48, at 824. 
62 See generally Tenney, supra note 48. 
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obtaining of income; 63 another is the continued existence in some 
jurisdictions of the basically conservative legal list statutes, under 
which adherence to the suggested investments guarantees im-
munity from surcharge. 64 Even the relatively flexible reasonable 
man rule to some extent fosters conservatism; for the absence 
of definite criteria by which a trustee may determine whether an 
investment is speculative may cause him to pursue the more con-
servative of two possible opportunities in order to avoid the pos-
sibilty of being surcharged by a jury using hindsight as its guide. 
Despite these tendencies toward conservatism, the reasonable 
man rule, properly applied, would seem to provide sufficient safe-
guards to deter unduly-conservative trust investments. In order 
to determine whether a trustee has breached his duty by entering 
into an unsound investment, a court will examine all the economic 
circumstances at the time the investment was made. By the same 
process of examining all the relevant circumstances, courts can 
protect beneficiaries from unduly-conservative investments where 
it is alleged that a reasonable man would have sought investments 
with greater growth potential and higher returns. Among the fac-
tors relevant to such a determination, a court should note the 
general economic conditions at the time of the making of the 
investment, including the prospects of inflation, as the trustee who 
today ignores this factor can hardly be deemed reasonable. The 
average returns of reputable fixed income and securities invest-
ments should also be noted. Apart from these purely economic 
considerations, however, a court should also judge the trustee's 
actions in light of the settlor's intent; for a policy of highly con-
servative investment may be entirely consonant with the primary 
purpose of the settlor. Thus, if the settlor's widow is the income 
beneficiary and the remainderman is unascertained, a reasonable 
trustee might well pursue a conservative investment policy, espe-
cially where the trust consists of a sizeable principal and the right 
of invasion of the corpus is provided for. On the other hand, if 
there is no such right of invasion, a trustee would seem to be well 
advised to balance the possibility of a slightly greater degree of 
risk to principal, but potentially greater return, against the 
widow's need for such a return. In reaching a decision, the rela-
tionship of the income beneficiary and the remainderman to the 
settlor, their respective ages, and the income beneficiary's depend-
63 See text at note 51 supra. 
64 See text at note 18 supra. 
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ence upon and need for the tn.1st income should also be taken into 
account. Whether professional trustees are or are not involved 
should also be a relevant consideration. Besides the experience 
and information available to them, the fact that they hold them-
selves out to the public as being skilled in their profession justifies 
the expectation of careful analysis of the market conditions which 
should lead to the greatest potential gains without undue risk to 
the trust principal. A reasonable professional trustee might well 
be expected to reach a far different investment decision than a 
person acting without such experience and information. 
A reasonable man approach to conservative investments would 
seem to be as fair to trustees as would be subjecting them to the 
same test for allegedly risky investments. As previously noted, the 
rule provides few set guidelines, but, by placing the burden on 
those claiming a breach of duty in failing to produce a reasonable 
income from the trust or in failing to increase its principal, the 
trustee would be safeguarded from surcharge in all but the most 
blatant of cases.65 And, as beneficiaries may be protected from 
unduly-conservative investments within the framework of the rea-
sonable man rule, there would seem to be no need to develop 
new trust investment doctrines to accomplish this end.66 
One additional approach, suggested as relevant in this area, 
deserves at least passing mention. As previously noted, 67 the pur-
chase of sound securities has been advanced as the only practical 
way to increase both trust income and principal, and provide a 
hedge against inflation. Therefore, it has been suggested that 
trust beneficiaries may be protected from unduly-conservative in-
vestments by imposing an affirmative duty upon trustees to invest 
some portion of the trust assets in common stock. This suggestion 
has been repeatedly rejected by writers, and for good cause;68 such 
an approach is inflexible in many of the same respects as are legal 
list statutes.69 It would seem far more realistic to approach the 
investment of trust funds with the view that the circumstances 
relevant to each individual trust may dictate different investment 
65 Commercial Trust Co. v. Barnard, discussed in the text at note I supra, provides 
an excellent example of the use of this type of approach. The trustee should be provided 
with added protection by examining his action in light of the whole trust portfolio rather 
than on an individual investment basis. Cf. Buek, supra note 48. 
66 In order for this protection to be universal, it is obvious that the few remaining 
states with legal list statutes would have to replace such statutes with "prudent man" 
statutes. 
67 See text at note 59 supra. 
68 See Tenney, supra note 48, at 826-27; Comment, 39 CALIF. L. REv. 380, 391 (1951). 
69 See text at notes 26-27 supra. 
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policies and that reasonable men may differ as to the details of 
these policies, including the amount, if any,70 to be invested in 
securities. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Courts have long attempted to discourage trustees from specu-
lating with the money of others by surcharging them for losses 
incurred in such ventures. Although the courts have recognized 
a duty on the part of the trustee to produce income from trust 
investments, there is no parallel development in the case law sur-
charging trustees for losses caused by unreasonably conservative 
investments. This anomaly in the law has encouraged trustees to 
pursue conservative investment policies. At the same time, trust 
beneficiaries have been spurred by the emergence of a continu-
ingly inflationary economy, the increased returns of reputable se-
curities, and the development of the professional, usually cor-
porate, trustee to seek protection against losses caused by clearly 
overly-conservative investment policies. 
It is probably unnecessary to develop new trust law doctrines 
to give this needed protection to beneficiaries. Rather, the courts 
should make greater use of the reasonable man rule to determine 
the validity of an allegedly unduly-conservative investment of trust 
funds in the same manner in which the validity of an allegedly 
speculative investment is determined. In applying the reasonable 
man rule, a court should take into consideration all relevant fac-
tors, including market conditions, the settlor's expressed or prob-
able intent, type of trustee involved and the beneficiaries' finan-
cial situations. If, after examining all the relevant factors, the 
court concludes that a reasonable man in the trustee's position 
would not have made such a conservative investment, it would 
seemingly be justified in surcharging the trustee for the losses oc-
casioned to the beneficiaries by the unreasonable investment. 71 
Lawrence Hirsch, S.Ed. 
70 Commercial Trust Co. v. Barnard, discussed in the text at note 1 supra, describes 
one set of circumstances in which the refusal to purchase securities was completely 
reasonable. 
71 Determining the amount of damages may present difficulties in this situation. 
The only feasible solution may be to base damages on the average appreciation rate 
and income return of similar trust funds. If a court feels that this measure of damages 
is too indefinite, it would still be possible to issue a decree ordering the trustee to 
change his pattern of investments. See generally Tenney, supra note 48. 
